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Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) for many social choice functions can be reduced
to testing sets of null hypotheses of the form “the average of this list is not greater than
1/2” for a collection of finite lists of non-negative numbers. Such social choice functions
include majority, super-majority, plurality, multi-winner plurality, Instant Runoff Vot-
ing (IRV), Borda count, approval voting, and STAR-Voting, among others. The audit
stops without a full hand count iff all the null hypotheses are rejected. The nulls can be
tested in many ways. Ballot polling is particularly simple; two new ballot-polling risk-
measuring functions for sampling without replacement are given. Ballot-level comparison
audits transform each null into an equivalent assertion that the mean of re-scaled tabu-
lation errors is not greater than 1/2. In turn, that null can then be tested using the same
statistical methods used for ballot polling—applied to different finite lists of non-negative
numbers: the SHANGRLA approach reduces auditing different social choice functions and
different audit methods to the same simple statistical problem. Moreover, SHANGRLA
comparison audits are more efficient than previous comparison audits for two reasons:
(i) for most social choice functions, the conditions tested are both necessary and suffi-
cient for the reported outcome to be correct, while previous methods tested conditions
that were sufficient but not necessary, and (ii) the tests avoid a conservative approxi-
mation. The SHANGRLA abstraction simplifies stratified audits, including audits that
combine ballot polling with ballot-level comparisons, producing sharper audits than the
“SUITE” approach. SHANGRLA works with the “phantoms to evil zombies” strategy to
treat missing ballot cards and missing or redacted cast vote records. That also facilitates
sampling from “ballot-style manifests,” which can dramatically improve efficiency when
the audited contests do not appear on every ballot card. Open-source software implement-
ing SHANGRLA ballot-level comparison audits is available. SHANGRLA was tested in a
pilot audit of an instant-runoff contest in San Francisco, CA, in November, 2019.
Keywords: sequential tests, martingales, Kolmogorov’s inequality
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1 Introduction
A risk-limiting audit (RLA) of a reported election contest outcome is any procedure that
guarantees a minimum probability of correcting the reported outcome if the reported
winner(s) did not really win, but never alters a correct reported outcome. The largest
probability that the procedure fail to correct the reported outcome if the reported outcome
is wrong is the risk limit.
RLAs were introduced by (P. Stark 2008b) and named by (P. Stark 2009b). RLA methods
have been developed for a variety of social choice functions, to accommodate election
equipment with different capabilities, and to comport with the logistics of ballot handling,
organization, and storage in different jurisdictions.
RLAs are considered the gold standard for post-election tabulation audits, recommended
by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (National Academies
of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018), the Presidential Commission on Election
Administration (Presidential Commission on Election Administration 2014), the Ameri-
can Statistical Association (American Statistical Association 2010), the League of Women
Voters, Verified Voting Foundation, the Brennan Center for Justice, and other organiza-
tions concerned with election integrity.
RLAs have been piloted dozens of times in 11 U.S. states and in Denmark. They are
required by statute in Colorado, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Virginia, and authorized by
statute in California and Washington.
A risk-limiting audit of a trustworthy paper record of voter intent can catch and correct
wrong election outcomes. (Here, “trustworthy” means that a full hand count of the votes in
the record would show the true winners.) But RLAs themselves check only the tabulation,
not the trustworthiness of the paper records. If the paper trail is not trustworthy, it is
not clear what a risk-limiting audit procedure accomplishes: while it can offer assurances
that tabulation error did not alter the reported outcome, it cannot determine whether
the reported outcome is right or wrong, nor can it promise any probability of correcting
wrong outcomes. It cannot limit the risk of certifying an outcome that is incorrect—the
“risk” that a risk-limiting audit is supposed to limit.
Because all electronic systems are vulnerable to bugs, misconfiguration, and hacking, the
paper trail can be trustworthy only if elections are conducted using voter-verified paper
ballots kept demonstrably secure throughout the canvass and the audit. In particular,
compliance audits (Benaloh et al. 2011; Stark and Wagner 2012; Lindeman and Stark
2012; Stark 2018) are needed to assure that the paper trail remains inviolate from the
time of casting through the completion of the audit.
However, that is not enough: the means of marking the paper matters. Recent experiments
have shown that voters rarely check BMD printout and rarely notice errors in BMD print-
out, even when instructed to check—verbally, through written instructions, and through
signage (Bernhard et al. 2020). Most BMD output is evidently not voter-verified. More-
over, while voters who notice errors in BMD printout may request a fresh chance to mark
a ballot, there is no way to tell whether the error was the voter’s fault or the BMD’s
fault (Kaczmarek et al. 2013; Bernhard et al. 2017; Appel, DeMillo, and Stark 2019). As
a result, malfunctioning BMDs may go undetected by election officials. Applying RLA
procedures to BMD printout cannot limit the risk that incorrect reported outcomes will
go uncorrected, unless one simply defines “correct outcome” to be whatever an accurate
tally of the paper would show, whether or not that reflects what voters indicated to the
equipment.
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There is free and open-source software to help with the random selection of ballot cards
and to perform the risk calculations to determine when and if the audit can stop.1
SHANGRLA uses a new abstract framing of RLAs that involves constructing a set of
assertions about each contest. The assertions are predicates on the set of ballot cards,
that is, they are either true or false, depending on what votes the whole set of trusted
paper ballot cards shows.
Each assertion is characterized by an assorter, a function that assigns a non-negative
number to each ballot card,2 again depending on the votes reflected on the ballot. The
assertions that characterize the audit are of the form “the average value of the assorter for
all the cast ballots is greater than 1/2.” In turn, each assertion is checked by testing the
complementary null hypothesis that the average is less than or equal to 1/2. To reject the
entire set of complementary null hypotheses is to confirm the outcomes of all the contests
under audit. Hence, the name of this method: Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate RLAs
(SHANGRLA).
By reducing auditing to repeated instances of a single, simple statistical problem—testing
whether the mean of a list of non-negative numbers is less than 1/2—SHANGRLA puts
ballot-polling audits, comparison audits, batch-level comparison audits, and stratified and
“hybrid” audits on the same footing, and makes it easy to incorporate statistical advances
into RLAs: only one function needs to be updated.
Open-source software implementing SHANGRLA audits is available.3 The software also
implements the “phantoms to evil zombies” approach of (Ban˜uelos and Stark 2012) for
dealing with missing cast-vote records and missing ballot cards, and which in turn makes
it possible to sample from “ballot-style manifests” (Benaloh et al. 2011; Lindeman and
Stark 2018), which makes possible more efficient audits of contests that do not appear
on every ballot card cast in the election. Despite the fact that they were developed more
than 7 years ago, neither “phantoms-to-zombies” nor sampling from ballot-style manifests
has been implemented before. The software was tested in practice in a pilot audit in San
Francisco, CA, in November 2019.
2 Assorted Simplifications
An assorter A assigns a non-negative value to each ballot, depending on the marks on
the ballot.
For instance, suppose that Alice and Bob are running against each other in a two-
candidate first-past-the-post contest. The following function is an assorter: assign the
value “1” if the ballot card has a mark for Alice but not for Bob; assign the value “0”
1 See, e.g., https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/users/stark/Vote/auditTools.htm,
https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/users/stark/Vote/ballotPollTools.htm, https://github.com/pbstark/auditTools,
https://github.com/pbstark/CORLA18/blob/master/code/suite toolkit.ipynb, and
https://github.com/votingworks/arlo (all last visited 10 November 2019); an im-
plementation of SHANGRLA ballot-level comparison audits is available at
https://github.com/pbstark/SHANGRLA.
2 A ballot consists of one or more ballot cards. Below, “ballot,” “card,” and “ballot card” are used
interchangeably, even though in most U.S. jurisdictions, a ballot consists of more than one ballot
card.
3 https://www.github.com/pbstark/SHANGRLA, last visited 22 November 2019.
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if the card has a mark for Bob but not for Alice; assign the value 1/2, otherwise (e.g., if
the card has an overvote or an undervote in this contest or does not contain the contest).
Then Alice beat Bob iff the average value of the assorter for the full set of cast ballot
cards is greater than 1/2: that implies that Alice got more than 50% of the valid votes.
To express this more mathematically, let bi denote the ith ballot card, and suppose there
are N ballot cards in all. Let 1Alice(bi) = 1 if ballot i has a mark for Alice, and 0 if not;
define 1Bob(bi) analogously. The assorter could be written
AAlice,Bob(bi) ≡ (1Alice(bi)− 1Bob(bi) + 1)/2.
If bi shows a mark for Alice but not for Bob, AAlice,Bob(bi) = 1. If it shows a mark for
Bob but not for Alice, AAlice,Bob(bi) = 0. If it shows marks for both Alice and Bob (an
overvote), for neither Alice nor Bob (an undervote), or if the ballot card does not contain
the Alice v. Bob contest at all, AAlice,Bob(bi) = 1/2. The average value of A over all ballot
cards is
A¯bAlice,Bob ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
AAlice,Bob(bi).
If Alice is the reported winner, the contest can be audited at risk limit α by testing the
complementary null hypothesis that A¯bAlice,Bob ≤ 1/2 at significance level α. To reject the
complementary null hypothesis is to conclude that Alice really won. If the complementary
null hypothesis is true, Bob won or the contest was a tie: the assertion is false.
An assorter offers more flexibility than just counting votes, though. For instance, instead
of either giving Alice one vote, half a vote, or no vote, an assorter could interpret a ballot
as giving Alice an arbitrary non-negative number as a vote, depending on the marks on
the ballot. This flexibility lets assorters solve the problem of auditing more complicated
social choice functions, as we shall see.
2.1 Plurality elections
In a plurality contest with K ≥ 1 winners and C > K candidates in all, a collection of
candidates {wk}
K
k=1 are the true winners and the remaining C −K candidates {ℓj}
C−K
j=1
are the true losers iff the assertions
A¯bwk,ℓj > 1/2, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ C −K
all hold, where Awk,ℓj is defined as above, with wk taking the role of Alice and ℓj taking
the role of Bob. (This is essentially the approach taken in (P. Stark 2008b, 2009a; Stark
2010; Lindeman and Stark 2012), reformulated and in different notation.) The contest can
be audited to risk limit α by testing the K(C −K) hypotheses A¯bwk,ℓj ≤ 1/2 individually
at significance level α. The audit stops only if all K(C −K) complementary hypotheses
are rejected; otherwise it requires a full hand count.
2.2 Approval Voting
Even though the voting rules are different, identical assorter functions work for approval
voting and plurality voting. Candidates {wk}
K
k=1 are the winners and the remaining C−K
candidates {ℓj}
C−K
j=1 are the losers iff all the assertions
A¯bwk,ℓj > 1/2, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K, 1 ≤ j ≤ C −K
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hold.
2.3 Super-majority
Suppose that a candidate must get at least a fraction f ∈ (1/2, 1] of the valid votes to
win. (P. Stark 2008b) shows how to audit this social choice function, but it can also be
expressed in terms of an assertion that the average of an assorter applied to the cast
ballots is greater than 1/2.
Alice really won a super-majority contest with required winning fraction f iff
(votes for Alice) > f × ((valid votes for Alice) + (valid votes for everyone else))
(1− f)× (votes for Alice) > f × (votes for everyone else),
i.e., iff
1− f
f
× (votes for Alice) > (votes for everyone else).
Define an assorter as follows:
A(bi) ≡


1
2f
, bi has a mark for Alice and no one else
0, bi has a mark for exactly one candidate and not Alice
1/2, otherwise.
(1)
This assigns a non-negative number to every ballot. Suppose that a fraction p > f of the
valid votes are for Alice, and that a fraction q of the ballots have valid votes. Then
A¯b ≡ pq/(2f) + (1− q)/2 ≥ q/2 + (1− q)/2 = 1/2.
Again, using assorters reduces auditing to the question of whether the average of a list of
non-negative numbers is greater than 1/2. The correctness of the outcome is implied by
a single assertion, unlike plurality elections, which require (number of winners)×(number
of losers) assertions.
2.4 D’Hondt and other proportional representation
schemes
(Stark and Teague 2014) show how to reduce the problem of auditing D’Hondt and other
proportional representation social choice functions to the problem of auditing a collection
of two-candidate majority contests. We have seen above that each such two-candidate
contest can be expressed as the assertion that the average of an assorter applied to the
ballots is greater than 1/2, so auditing proportional representation contests can be reduced
to auditing a collection of assertions that the averages of a set of assorters over the cast
ballots is greater than 1/2.
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2.5 Borda count, STAR-Voting, and other weighted
additive voting schemes
Borda count is one of several voting systems that assign points to candidates for each
ballot, depending on what the ballot shows; the winner is the candidate who receives the
most points in total across all cast ballots. This involves only a slight generalization of
plurality contests to account for the fact that a ballot can give a candidate more than one
“point,” while for plurality a candidate either gets a vote or not. As before, the reported
result is correct if the reported winner actually received more points than each reported
loser, which we can test by constructing an assorter for each (winner, loser) pair.
Let sAlice(bi) denote a non-negative “score” for Alice on ballot i, and let sBob(bi) be the
score for Bob. These need not be integers. Let s+ be an upper bound on the score any
candidate can get on a ballot. Alice beat Bob iff
N∑
i=1
sAlice(bi) >
N∑
i=1
sBob(bi),
i.e., iff
s¯bAlice > s¯
b
Bob.
Make the affine transformation
A(bi) ≡ (sAlice(bi)− sBob(bi) + s
+)/(2s+).
Then A(bi) ≥ 0 and s¯
b
Alice > s¯
b
Bob iff A¯
b > 1/2.
2.6 Ranked-Choice and Instant-Runoff Voting (RCV/IRV)
(Blom, Stuckey, and Teague 2019) show how to reduce the correctness of a reported IRV
winner to the correctness of the reported winners of a set of two-candidate contests. The
“candidates” in those contests are not necessarily the candidates in the original contest;
they are just two mutually exclusive (but not exhaustive) conditions that a ballot might
satisfy.
There are two types of assertions that can be combined to give sufficient conditions for
the reported winner of an IRV contest to have really won:
1. Candidate i has more first-place ranks than candidate j has total mentions.
2. After a set of candidates have been eliminated from consideration, candidate i is the
top ranked candidate on more ballot cards than candidate j is.
Both of these can be written as A¯b > 1/2 by labeling the corresponding vote patterns
“Alice” or “Bob” or “Neither.”
For instance, consider the first type of assertion. If bi has candidate i ranked 1, the ballot
is considered a vote for Alice. If bi ranks candidate j at all, the ballot is considered a
vote for Bob. Otherwise, the ballot is not a vote for either of them. If Alice beat Bob,
candidate j cannot have beaten candidate i in the IRV contest.
In contrast to plurality, supermajority, approval, Borda, and d’Hondt, the assertions de-
rived by (Blom, Stuckey, and Teague 2019) are sufficient for the reported winner to have
won, but not necessary. Hence, it might be possible to sharpen such audits.
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3 Auditing assertions
We audit the assertion A¯b > 1/2 by testing the complementary null hypothesis A¯b ≤ 1/2
statistically. We audit until either all complementary null hypotheses about a contest are
rejected at significance level α, or until all ballots have been tabulated by hand. This
yields a RLA of the contest in question at risk limit α.
3.1 Ballot-polling audits
Ballot-polling audits select individual ballot cards at random, either with or without
replacement. The BRAVO method of (Lindeman, Stark, and Yates 2012) uses Wald’s
Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) for sampling with replacement.
For each (reported winner, reported loser) pair, BRAVO tests the conditional probability
that a ballot contains a vote for the reported winner given that it contains a vote for
the reported winner or the reported loser. Using assorters allows us to eliminate the
conditioning, and opens the door to a broader collection of statistical tests, including
tests based on sampling without replacement, which can improve the efficiency of the
audit. Two such methods are presented below. In contrast to the SPRT, these methods
only require knowing the reported winners, not the reported vote shares.
First, we shall derive the Kaplan-Kolmogorov method for sampling without replacement,
based on ideas in Harold Kaplan’s (now defunct) website.4 The method is based on the
observation that a suitably constructed sequence is a nonnegative martingale, to which
Kolmogorov’s inequality for optionally stopped closed martingales can be applied.
We sample without replacement from a finite population ofN non-negative items, {x1, . . . , xN},
with xj ≥ 0, ∀j. The population mean is µ =
1
N
∑N
j=1 xj ≥ 0 and the population total is
Nµ ≥ 0. The value of the jth item drawn is Xj . On the hypothesis that µ = t, EX1 = t,
so E(X1/t) = 1. Conditional on X1, . . . , Xn, the total of the remaining N − n items is
Nµ−
∑n
j=1Xj , so the mean of the remaining items is
Nt −
∑n
j=1 Xj
N − n
=
t− 1
N
∑n
j=1Xj
1− n/N
.
Thus, the expected value of Xn+1 given X1, . . . , Xn is
t− 1
N
∑n
j=1 Xj
1−n/N
. Define
Y1(t) ≡
{
X1/t, Nt > 0,
1, Nt = 0,
and for 1 ≤ n ≤ N − 1,
Yn+1(t) ≡

Xn+1
1− n
N
t− 1
N
∑
n
j=1
Xj
,
∑n
j=1Xj < Nt,
1,
∑n
j=1Xj ≥ Nt.
Then E(Yn+1(t)|Y1, . . . Yn) = 1. Let Zn(t) ≡
∏n
j=1 Yj(t). Note that Yk(t) can be recovered
from {Zj(t), j ≤ k}, since Yk(t) = Zk(t)/Zk−1(t). Now E|Zk| ≤ maxj xj <∞ and
E (Zn+1(t)|Z1(t), . . . Zn(t)) = E (Yn+1(t)Zn(t)|Z1(t), . . . Zn(t)) = Zn(t).
4 http://web.archive.org/web/20131209044835/http://printmacroj.com/martMean.htm
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Thus
(Z1(t), Z2(t), . . . , ZN (t))
is a non-negative closed martingale. By Kolmogorov’s inequality, an application of Markov’s
inequality to martingales (Feller 1971, 242), for any p > 0 and any J ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Pr
(
max
1≤j≤J
Zj(t) > 1/p
)
≤ p E|ZJ |.
Since (Zj) is a non-negative martingale, E|ZJ | = EZJ = EZ1 = 1. Thus a P -value for the
hypothesis µ = t based on data X1, . . . XJ is (max1≤j≤J Zj(t))
−1 ∧ 1.
However, if Xj = 0 for some j, then Zk = 0 for all k ≥ j. To avoid that problem, we can
shift everything to the right: pick γ > 0, find a lower confidence bound for δ = µ+ γ >
µ > 0 from data {Xj + γ}, then subtract γ from the lower confidence bound to get a
lower confidence bound for µ. There are tradeoffs involved in picking γ: if many Xj turn
out to be small, especially for small j, it helps to have γ large, and vice versa.
Unpacking the math yields the P -value
pKK ≡ 1 ∧
(
max
1≤j≤J
j∏
k=1
(Xk + γ)
1− (k − 1)/N
t− 1
N
∑k−1
ℓ=1 (Xℓ + γ)
)−1
for the hypothesis that µ ≤ t− γ. This is implemented in the SHANGRLA software.
A related test that uses sampling without replacement, also introduced without proof
on Kaplan’s website, can be derived as follows. Let Sj ≡
∑j
k=1Xk, S˜j ≡ Sj/N , and
j˜ ≡ 1− (j − 1)/N . Define
Yn ≡
∫ 1
0
n∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ.
This is a polynomial in γ of degree at most n, with constant term 1. Each Xj appears
linearly. Under the null hypothesis that the population total is Nt, EX1 = t, and
E (Xj | X1, . . . , Xj−1) =
Nt− Sj−1
N − j + 1
=
t− S˜j−1
j˜
.
Now
Y1 =
∫ 1
0
(γ[X1/t− 1] + 1) dγ =
[
(γ2/2)[X1/t− 1] + γ
]1
γ=0
= [X1/t−1]/2+1 =
X1
2t
+1/2.
Thus, under the null,
EY1 =
EX1
2t
+ 1/2 = 1.
Also,
E(Yn|X1, . . . , Xn−1) = E
[∫ 1
0
n∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ
∣∣∣∣∣X1, . . . , Xn−1
]
=
∫ 1
0
(
γ
[
E(Xn|X1, . . . , Xn−1)
n˜
t− S˜n−1
− 1
]
+ 1
) n−1∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ
=
∫ 1
0
(
γ
[
t− S˜n−1
n˜
n˜
t− S˜n−1
− 1
]
+ 1
) n−1∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ
Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting Audits: SHANGRLA 9
=
∫ 1
0
n−1∏
j=1
(
γ
[
Xj
j˜
t− S˜j−1
− 1
]
+ 1
)
dγ = Yn−1.
Hence, under the null hypothesis, (Yj)
N
j=1 is a non-negative closed martingale with ex-
pected value 1, and Kolmogorov’s inequality implies that for any J ∈ {1, . . . , N},
Pr
(
max
1≤j≤J
Yj(t) > 1/p
)
≤ p.
This method for finding a P -value for the hypothesis A¯b ≤ 1/2 is also implemented in the
SHANGRLA software, using a novel approach to integrating the polynomial recursively
due to Steven N. Evans (U.C. Berkeley). This was the risk-measuring function used in
the San Francisco IRV audit pilot in November, 2019.
3.2 Ballot-comparison audits
Ballot-comparison audits rely on cast vote records (CVRs), which are how the voting
equipment interpreted each ballot. To conduct a ballot-comparison audit, there should
be a CVR for every physical ballot, and vice versa (however, see section sec. 3.4 below).
Suppose that we apply the assorters for a contest to the CVRs, and all have averages
greater than 1/2. Then the assertions are true for the actual ballots provided the CVRs
did not inflate the average value of the assorter by more than the assorter margin, twice
the mean of the assorter applied to the reported CVRs, minus 1, as we shall see.
By how much could error in an individual CVR inflate the value of the assorter compared
to the value the assorter has for the actual ballot? Since the assorter does not assign a
negative value to any ballot, the overstatement error ωi for CVR i is at most the value
the assorter assigned to CVR i.
That there is such a bound for the overstatement error is key to auditing: otherwise, a
single extreme value could make a contest result wrong, and it would take a prohibitively
large sample to rule out that possibility.
If we reject the hypothesis that the mean overstatement error is large, we conclude that
the assertion that the assorter mean exceeds 1/2. The audit of that assertion can stop.
Let bi denote the ith ballot, and let ci denote the cast-vote record for the ith ballot. Let A
denote an assorter, which maps votes on a ballot into [0, u), where u is an upper bound on
the value A assigns to any ballot card or CVR. For instance, for plurality voting, u = 1;
for super-mnajority, u = 1/(2f), where f is the fraction of valid votes required to win.
The overstatement error for the ith ballot is
ωi ≡ A(ci)− A(bi) ≤ A(ci) ≤ u. (2)
Let
A¯c ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
A(cj) and ω¯ ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
ωj .
Now A¯b = A¯c− ω¯, so A¯b > 1/2 iff ω¯ < A¯c−1/2. We know that A¯c > 1/2 (or the reported
winner would be different), so ω¯ < A¯c − 1/2 iff
ω¯
2A¯c − 1
< 1/2.
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Define v ≡ 2A¯c − 1, the reported assorter margin. In a two-candidate plurality contest, v
is the fraction of ballot cards with valid votes for the reported winner, minus the fraction
with valid votes for the reported loser. This is the diluted margin of (Stark 2010; Lindeman
and Stark 2012). (Margins are commonly calculated as the difference in votes divided by
the number of valid votes. Diluted refers to the fact that the denominator is the number
of ballot cards, which is greater than or equal to the number of valid votes.)
With this notation, the condition is:
ω¯
v
< 1/2.
Let τi ≡ 1− ωi/u ≥ 0, and τ¯ ≡ (1/N)
∑N
i=1 τi = 1− ω¯/u. Then ω¯ = u(1− τ¯ ) and
ω¯
v
=
u
v
(1− τ¯).
Now ω/v < 1/2 iff u
v
(1− τ¯ ) < 1/2, i.e.,
−
u
v
τ¯ < 1/2−
u
v
τ¯ > 1−
v
2u
τ¯
2− v
u
> 1/2.
Finally, define B(bi, c) ≡ τi/(2− v/u) = (1− ωi/u)/(2 − v/u) > 0, i = 1, . . . , N . Then B
assigns non-negative numbers to ballots, and the outcome is correct iff
B¯ ≡
1
N
N∑
i=1
Bi > 1/2.
It is an assorter! Any technique that can be used with ballot polling, including those in
sec. 3.1, can also be used to test the assertion B¯ > 1/2.
This assertion-based approach to comparison audits is sharper than methods that rely on
the maximum across-contest relative overstatement of margins (MACRO) (Stark 2010) in
at least two ways: avoiding combining overstatements across candidates or contests gives
a sharper upper bound on the total error in each (winner, loser) sub-contest, and the
test statistic avoids combining overstatements across contests, which otherwise can lead
to unnecessary escalation of the audit if an overstatement is observed in a contest with a
wide margin.
3.3 Stratified audits
Stratified sampling can be useful if a jurisdiction has a heterogenous mix of election
equipment with different capability, e.g., ballot-polling for precinct-based optical scan,
where it can be difficult to associate ballot cards with cast-vote records, and ballot-level
comparisons for central-count optical scan.
Stratified sampling for RLAs has been addressed in a number of papers, including (P. Stark
2008b, 2008a, 2009a; Higgins, Rivest, and Stark 2011; Ottoboni et al. 2018). The central
idea of the approach taken in SUITE (Ottoboni et al. 2018) can be used with SHANGRLA
to accommodate stratified sampling and to combine ballot-polling and ballot-level com-
parison audits: Look at all allocations of error across strata that would result in an
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incorrect outcome. Reject the hypothesis that the outcome is incorrect if the maximum
P -value across all such allocations is less than the risk limit.
SHANGRLA will generally yield a sharper (i.e., more efficient) test than SUITE, because
it deals more efficiently with ballot cards that do not contain the contest in question,
because it avoids combining overstatements across candidate pairs and across contests,
and because it accommodates sampling without replacement more efficiently.
With SHANGRLA, whatever the sampling scheme used to select ballots or groups of
ballots, the underlying statistical question is the same: is the average value of each assorter
applied to all the ballot cards greater than 1/2?
Suppose the cast ballot cards are partitioned into S ≥ 2 strata, where stratum s contains
Ns ballot cards, so N =
∑S
s=1Ns. Let A¯
b
s denote the mean of the assorter applied to just
the ballot cards in stratum s. Then
A¯b =
1
N
S∑
s=1
NsA¯
b
s =
S∑
s=1
Ns
N
A¯bs.
We can reject the hypothesis A¯b ≤ 1/2 if we can reject the hypothesis
⋂
s∈S
{
Ns
N
A¯bs ≤ βs
}
for all (βs)
S
s=1 such that
∑S
s=1 βs ≤ 1/2. Let Ps(βs) be a P -value for the hypothesis
A¯bs ≤
N
Ns
βs. That P -value could result from ballot polling, ballot-level comparison, batch-
level comparison, or any other valid method. For instance, it could be produced by the
methods described in sec. 3.1 or sec. 3.2.
Suppose that the samples from different strata are independent, so that {Ps(βs)}
S
s=1 are
independent random variables. Then Fisher’s combining function (or any other method
for nonparametric combination of tests) can be used to construct an overall P -value
for the intersection null hypothesis
⋂
s∈S
{
Ns
N
A¯bs ≤ βs
}
. In particular, if the intersection
hypothesis is true, then the probability distribution of
−2
S∑
s=1
lnPs(βs)
is dominated by the chi-square distribution with 2S degrees of freedom, as discussed in
(Ottoboni et al. 2018). That makes it possible to assign a conservative P -value to the
hypothesis
⋂
s∈S
{
Ns
N
A¯bs ≤ βs
}
for every (βs)
S
s=1 such that
∑S
s=1 βs ≤ 1/2. If all such
S-tuples can be rejected, we may conclude that A¯b > 1/2.
3.4 Zombie Bounds II: Return of the Missing Ballot
(Ban˜uelos and Stark 2012) discuss how to conduct RLAs when not every ballot is ac-
counted for or when a ballot cannot be retrieved. They cover both ballot-polling audits
and ballot-level comparison audits. This section presents a brief but more systematic
treatment for ballot-level comparison audits, reflecting what the SHANGRLA software
implements. This method also makes it possible to use ballot-card style information to tar-
get the sampling to ballot cards that the voting system claims contain the contest, while
protecting against the possibility that the voting system does not report that information
accurately.
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To conduct a RLA, it is crucial to have an upper bound on the total number of ballot
cards cast in the contest. Absent such a bound, arbitrarily many ballots could be missing
from the tabulation, and the true winner(s) could be any candidate(s). Let N denote an
upper bound on the number of ballot cards that contain the contest. Suppose that n ≤ N
CVRs contain the contest and that each CVR is associated with a unique, identifiable
physical ballot that can be retrieved if that CVR is selected for audit. The phantoms-to-
evil zombies approach is as follows.
If N > n, create N − n “phantom ballots” and N − n “phantom CVRs.” Calculate the
assorter mean for all the CVRs—including the phantoms—treating the phantom CVRs
as if they do not contain the contest (i.e., the assorter assigns the value 1/2 to phantom
CVRs). Find the corresponding assorter margin (twice the assorter mean, minus 1).
To conduct the audit, sample integers between 1 and N .
– If the resulting integer is between 1 and n, retrieve and inspect the ballot card asso-
ciated with the corresponding CVR.
• If the associated ballot contains the contest, calculate the overstatement error as
in equation {eq. 2}.
• If the associated ballot does not contain the contest, calculate the overstatement
using the value the assorter assigned to the CVR, but as if the value the assorter
assigns to the physical ballot is zero (that is, the overstatement is equal to the
value the assorter assigns to the CVR).
– If the resulting integer is between n+ 1 and N , we have drawn a phantom CVR and
a phantom ballot. Calculate the overstatement as if the value the assorter assigned
to the phantom ballot was 0 (turning the phantom into an “evil zombie”), and as if
the value the assorter assigned to the CVR was 1/2.
Proposition: if the risk is calculated based on this substitution of “evil zombies” for
“phantoms,” the result is still a RLA with the desired risk-limit.
Proof: Every unaccounted for ballot card that might have or should have contained the
contest is treated in the least favorable way. Every unaccounted for CVR is treated in
exactly the way it was tabulated by the assorter, namely, it is assigned the value 1/2.
Some jurisdictions, notably Colorado, redact CVRs if revealing them might compromise
vote anonymity. If such CVRs are omitted from the tally and the number of phantom
CVRs and ballots are increased correspondingly, this approach still leads to a valid RLA.
But if they are included in the tally, they should be treated as if they had the value u (the
largest value the assorter can assign) in calculating the overstatement if they are selected
for audit.
4 Discussion
4.1 From many, one
Even though SHANGRLA may involve testing many assertions in the audit of one or
more contests, there is no need to adjust for multiplicity. If any assertion is false, the
chance that its complementary hypothesis will be rejected is at most α. If more than one
assertion is false, the chance that all the complementary hypotheses will be rejected is at
most α, because the probability of the intersection of a collection of events cannot exceed
the probability of any of the events individually. Thus, if any of the reported winners did
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not really win, the chance that every complementary null hypothesis will be rejected is at
most α: the chance that the audit will stop without a full hand count is not greater than
the risk limit.
4.2 Sharpness and Efficiency
Extant comparison audit methods rely on MACRO, the maximum across-contest relative
overstatement of margins (P. Stark 2008a). MACRO is embedded in Colorado’s CORLA
audit tool, in the Arlo audit tool, and auditTools. MACRO involves combining discrepan-
cies across pairs of candidates and across contests in a way that is conservative, but not
sharp. That is, the condition that is tested is necessary for one or more reported outcomes
to be incorrect, but is not sufficient. In contrast, by keeping the pairwise margins sepa-
rate, SHANGRLA is sharp for plurality, super-majority, approval, Borda, STAR-Voting,
etc. (but in general not for RCV/IRV). The conditions it tests are both necessary and
sufficient for one or more outcomes to be incorrect. This generally allows smaller sample
sizes to confirm the results when the reported contest outcomes are correct.
4.3 The Power of Positivity
Working with assertions reduces election auditing to testing hypotheses of the form A¯b <
1/2: the only statistical issue is to test whether the mean of a finite list of non-negative
numbers is less than 1/2. As new techniques for testing that hypothesis are developed,
they can be applied immediately to election audits.
4.4 To Halve or Halve not?
Assertions might look more elegant expressed as A¯b > 1 rather than A¯b > 1/2, which
would just involve re-defining A by multiplying it by 2. However, keeping the connection
between assorter means and getting more than 50% of the vote in a two-candidate majority
contest seems to be a helpful mnemonic. It also might feel more natural to write an
assertion as or A¯b > 0, but that would cut the connection to getting more than a 50%
vote share, and also make the lower bound less natural than A(bi) ≥ 0 for all i.
Similarly, defining the “assertion margin” to be v ≡ 2(A¯c−1/2) rather than A¯c−1/2 keeps
the parallel to a two-candidate plurality contest, where the “margin” would generally be
defined to be the winner’s vote share minus the loser’s vote share.
5 Conclusions
Risk-limiting audits of a broad variety of social choice functions can be reduced to test-
ing whether the mean of any list among a set of finite lists of non-negative numbers is
less than or equal to 1/2. That is, Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting
Audits (SHANGRLA). Those hypotheses can be tested directly, e.g., by ballot polling,
or indirectly, by ballot-level comparisons or other methods. They can also be tested us-
ing Bernoulli sampling (Ottoboni et al. 2019), stratified sampling, and “hybrid” meth-
ods following the same general approach as SUITE (Ottoboni et al. 2018), see 3.3, but
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SHANGRLA is generally more efficient. The sampling unit can be an individual ballot, or
a cluster of ballots (e.g., all ballots cast in a single precinct or tabulated by a particular
machine).
Ballot-level comparison audits can also be framed as testing whether any of the means of a
set of finite lists of non-negative numbers is less than or equal to 1/2, allowing exactly the
same statistical tests to be used for ballot-polling audits and for ballot-level comparison
audits, unifying the treatment of audits.
This paper proves the validity of two hypothesis tests for that statistical problem based
on sampling without replacement, both of which were stated without proof in a now-
defunct website of Harold Kaplan but apparently never published. Both proofs are based
on Kolmogorov’s inequality for optionally stopped martingales.
Even though auditing one or more contests generally involves testing many half-average
nulls, no multiplicity adjustment is needed, because the audit only stops if all the nulls
are rejected.
For many social choice functions (including plurality, multi-winner plurality, majority,
super-majority, approval, Borda count, and STAR-Voting), SHANGRLA comparison au-
dits are sharper than previous comparison audit methods based on MACRO because the
conditions it tests are both necessary and sufficient for the reported outcomes to be wrong,
while previous methods tested conditions that were necessary but not sufficient. (MACRO
bounds the maximum of a set of sums by the sum of the term-by-term maxima, both in
the condition and in the test statistic; SHANGRLA keeps the maxima separate, both in
the condition and in the test statistic.)
SHANGRLA also “plays nice” with the phantoms-to-zombies approach (Ban˜uelos and
Stark 2012) for dealing with missing ballot cards and missing cast-vote records, which
has two benefits: (i) it makes it easy to treat missing ballots rigorously, and (ii) it can
substantially improve the efficiency of auditing contests that do not appear on every ballot
card, by allowing the sample to be drawn just from cards that the voting system claims
contain the contest, without having to trust that the voting system correctly identified
which cards contain the contest.
Open-source software implementing SHANGRLA comparison audits and the phantoms-
to-zombies approach is available; the software was tested in a pilot audit of an IRV contest
in San Francisco, CA, in November 2019.
Bibliography
American Statistical Association. 2010. “American Statistical Association Statement on
Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits.” www.amstat.org/outreach/pdfs/Risk-Limiting_Endorsement.pdf.
Appel, A.W., R. DeMillo, and P.B. Stark. 2019. “Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Assure
theWill of the Voters.” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3375755.
Ban˜uelos, J.H., and P.B. Stark. 2012. “Limiting Risk by Turning Manifest Phantoms into
Evil Zombies.” arXiv.org. http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.3413.
Benaloh, J., D. Jones, E. Lazarus, M. Lindeman, and P.B. Stark. 2011. “SOBA: Secrecy-
Preserving Observable Ballot-Level Audits.” In Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting
Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (EVT/WOTE ’11). USENIX.
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/soba11.pdf.
Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate Risk-Limiting Audits: SHANGRLA 15
Bernhard, M., J.A. Halderman, R.L. Rivest, P. Vora, P.Y.A. Ryan, V. Teague, J. Benaloh,
P.B. Stark, and D. Wallach. 2017. “Public Evidence from Secret Ballots.” In Electronic
Voting. E-Vote-Id 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 10615, edited by R. Krim-
mer, M. Volkamer, N. Braun Binder, N Kersting, O. Pereira, and C. Schu¨rmann. springer.
Bernhard, M., A. McDonald, H. Meng, J. Hwa, N. Bajaj, K. Chang, and J.A. Halderman.
2020. “Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?” In 41st
Ieee Symposium on Security and Privacy, (in press). IEEE.
Blom, Michelle, Peter J Stuckey, and Vanessa Teague. 2019. “Risk-Limiting Audits for
Irv Elections.” arXiv Preprint arXiv:1903.08804.
Feller, W. 1971. An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applications. Vol. II. New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Higgins, M.J., R.L. Rivest, and P.B. Stark. 2011. “Sharper P-Values for Stratified Post-
Election Audits.” Statistics, Politics, and Policy 2 (1). http://www.bepress.com/spp/vol2/iss1/7.
Kaczmarek, T., J. Wittrock, R.T. Carback, A. Florescu, J. Rubio, N. Runyan, P.L. Vora,
and F. Zago´rski. 2013. “Dispute Resolution in Accessible Voting Systems: The Design
and Use of Audiotegrity.” In E-Voting and Identity: 4th International Conference, Vote-
Id 2013, Guildford, Uk, July 2013. LNCS Volume 7985, edited by J. Heather, S. Schneider,
and V. Teague, 127–41.
Lindeman, M., and P.B. Stark. 2012. “A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits.”
IEEE Security and Privacy 10: 42–49.
Lindeman, M., P.B. Stark, and V. Yates. 2012. “BRAVO: Ballot-Polling Risk-Limiting
Audits to Verify Outcomes.” In Proceedings of the 2011 Electronic Voting Technology
Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy Elections (Evt/Wote ’11). USENIX.
Lindeman, N. McBurnett, M., and P.B. Stark. 2018. “Next Steps for the Colorado Risk-
Limiting Audit (CORLA) Program.” https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.00698.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2018. Securing the Vote: Pro-
tecting American Democracy. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25120.
Ottoboni, K., M. Bernhard, A. Halderman, R.L. Rivest, and P.B. Stark. 2019. “Bernoulli
Ballot Polling: A Manifest Improvement for Risk-Limiting Audits.” Voting ’19.
Ottoboni, K., P.B. Stark, M. Lindeman, and N. McBurnett. 2018. “Risk-Limiting Audits
by Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections (Suite).” In Electronic Voting. E-Vote-
Id 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-00419-4_12.
Presidential Commission on Election Administration. 2014. “The American Voting Expe-
rience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Election Admin-
istration.” https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/6/Amer-Voting-Exper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf.
Stark, P.B. 2008a. “A Sharper Discrepancy Measure for Post-Election Audits.” Ann. Appl.
Stat. 2: 982–85. http://arxiv.org/abs/0811.1697.
———. 2008b. “Conservative Statistical Post-Election Audits.” Ann. Appl. Stat. 2: 550–
81. http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.4005.
———. 2009a. “CAST: Canvass Audits by Sampling and Testing.” IEEE Transactions
on Information Forensics and Security, Special Issue on Electronic Voting 4: 708–17.
16 Philip B. Stark
———. 2009b. “Risk-Limiting Post-Election Audits: P -Values from Common Probability
Inequalities.” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 4: 1005–14.
———. 2010. “Super-Simple Simultaneous Single-Ballot Risk-Limiting Audits.” In Pro-
ceedings of the 2010 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop / Workshop on Trustworthy
Elections (EVT/WOTE ’10). USENIX. http://www.usenix.org/events/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Stark.pdf.
———. 2018. “An Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits and Evidence-Based Elections,
Written Testimony Prepared for the Little Hoover Commission.” https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/lhc18.pdf.
Stark, Philip B., and Vanessa Teague. 2014. “Verifiable European Elections: Risk-Limiting
Audits for d’Hondt and Its Relatives.” JETS: USENIX Journal of Election Technology
and Systems 3.1. https://www.usenix.org/jets/issues/0301/stark.
Stark, Philip B., and David A. Wagner. 2012. “Evidence-Based Elections.” IEEE Security
and Privacy 10: 33–41.
